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The development of “new” media and the financial investment in football since 
the early 1990s have dramatically changed the football club–media relationship. 
A number of clubs changed ownership and organizational structure for financial 
gain or financial survival while the increasing demand for immediate information 
led to clubs’ recognizing the importance of external communication. Drawing 
on 47 semistructured interviews with media personnel and 827 questionnaires 
completed by supporters at 4 football clubs, this article assesses the organizational 
structure of clubs in dealing with the media and supporters and the level of depen-
dence between clubs and the external media. The results highlight changes in the 
organizational structure of clubs and their strategies for external communication, 
as well as the contrasting relationships between football clubs and the external 
media. As ownership and personnel changes occur, clubs should remember the 
importance of the 2-way relationships they are in with supporters and the media.
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During the 1980s, unprecedented events occurred in football. Those in the 
media were arguably the most dramatic. What initially began with increasing cov-
erage given to football by terrestrial television ended with the remarkable escala-
tion of what Boyle and Haynes (2004) term “new” media (satellite television, the 
Internet, and mobile phones) and the way they (particularly satellite television) 
began to view football as a marketable commodity. Perhaps not surprising, the 
new media changed the political economy of football and helped make it an ever 
more important part of popular culture, stimulated by large levels of coverage and 
exposure. This also produced a more competitive media environment, with many 
“older” sources (such as newspapers and radio) forced to react to the market pres-
sure created by “newer” ones.
In this respect, I shall argue that the development of new media has affected 
the level of dependence (or “interdependence”) between old and new media and 
football clubs playing at different levels of the professional game. Although it could 
be suggested that some media sources are more dependent on clubs than vice versa, 
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the term interdependence is used in this article where equal dependence occurs 
between external media sources and football clubs.1
It is not surprising that changes in the media also affected football clubs. At 
the elite level, clubs became larger organizations through investment linked to 
the Premier League (formed in 1992) and the subsequent redistribution of money 
through television broadcasting. This resulted in clubs at all levels altering their 
organizational structure, but in various ways. A number of the bigger clubs followed 
the example of Tottenham Hotspur (it floated in 1983) and floated on the stock 
market for the perceived financial reward that it initially offered, but, at the lower 
levels, Supporters’ Trusts were developed, often for financial survival (Football 
Governance Research Centre, 2005; Hamil, Michie, Oughton, & Warby, 2001). This 
led to many clubs changing the way they communicated externally, often resulting 
in their employing press or media officers to deal with the increasing demands on 
clubs for news and information and access to players and managers. It also cre-
ated more of a commercial focus as clubs examined ways of broadening revenue 
streams, leading to a more professionally oriented organizational structure through 
the appointment of a chief executive and/or marketing or commercial directors.
Subsequently, this article examines the club–media relationship at four profes-
sional football clubs (Aston Villa, Birmingham City, Coventry City, and Northamp-
ton Town). To do this I have two objectives: to examine the organizational structure 
of each club in dealing with supporters and the external media and to analyze the 
level of dependence between each club and the external media. For the purposes 
of this article, external media refers to media sources that fall outside of clubs’ 
control, such as the local and national media.
Overall, this article adds substantial value to the club–media debate. Wider 
research refers to an increasing level of interdependence between satellite televi-
sion and Premier League clubs, particularly through the increasing importance of 
broadcasting revenue over gate revenue (Buraimo, Simmons, & Szymanski, 2006; 
Deloitte & Touche, 2008), but this is not directly stipulated. Furthermore, limited 
attention has been paid to the changing relationship between clubs and the local 
press (at all levels) and the increasing importance of club employees to improve 
external communication (Football Research Unit, 1999). Finally, in terms of the 
impact the media have had on clubs, again much research focuses on the changing 
ownership and organizational structure of clubs at the elite level, rather than through 
the game as a whole (Gannon, Evans, & Goddard, 2006). This article builds on all 
of these areas, examining all levels of professional football.
The Changing Club–Media Relationship
This article describes how the modern club–media relationship revolves around two 
notable developments. The first is how the political economy of football began to 
change during the 1980s but rapidly gathered pace after the formation of the Premier 
League in 1992. Historically, an interdependent relationship existed between the 
local newspaper and the local football club, as the local newspaper relied on the 
interest generated in clubs to increase sales and clubs relied on the local newspaper 
to provide regular communication with supporters. More recently it could be argued 
that this interdependence has now expanded to satellite television because of the 
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investment and coverage it provides to clubs (mostly those in the Premier League) 
and the need for it to generate profits through sales and advertising.
The second development is how this growing relationship led to changing 
patterns of ownership and external communication among clubs, most notably the 
bigger ones. Originally, throughout the 1990s, in addition to floating on the stock 
market, media companies began buying into certain clubs because it allowed them 
to be involved in negotiations for future television contracts and, as such, changed 
the relationship further, particularly at the elite level. However, this practice is now 
being replaced by wealthy overseas investors who are increasingly attracted to the 
English game. All of this has created a more professional approach in the way that 
clubs manage their external communication (such as with external media, fans, the 
local community, and shareholders), particularly when issues (like a crisis) arise 
and require immediate action.
The changing political economy of the club–media relationship can be traced 
back to the early 1980s. It began in 1983 when the first contract to show exclusive 
live matches was agreed between ITV, the BBC (initially it was shared jointly 
between the two major television broadcasters), and the Football League at an 
annual cost of £2.6 million. However, it really gathered pace in the early 1990s. First, 
British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) merged with Sky in 1990 (creating BSkyB), 
and second, a new Premier League was formed, to begin in 1992.
These two changes led to the loss of live matches on terrestrial television, 
with BSkyB winning the exclusive rights over a rival bid from ITV for a 5-year 
contract worth £304 million to start broadcasting live Premier League matches from 
August 1992. This decision fundamentally changed both the economics of English 
football and the club–media relationship as clubs in the Premier League realized 
the financial windfall such an agreement would bring. In fact, this relationship 
continued throughout the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century, with 
the next three available contracts for exclusive rights to Premier League matches 
all purchased by BSkyB.2
However, the monopoly held by BSkyB on the live coverage of English Premier 
League matches changed when the 2007–2009 broadcasting rights became avail-
able after intervention by the European Union, who argued that the broadcasting 
market in England was anticompetitive. To try to combat this ruling, the Premier 
League split the live coverage of matches into six separate packages and invited 
bids from rival broadcasters for each of them. BSkyB eventually won four and paid 
£1.31 billion to broadcast 92 more desirable live matches a season, with the Irish 
pay-TV group Setanta initially purchasing the other two for £392 million, show-
ing 46 games a season. Including the highlights rights paid by the BBC (£171.6 
million) the total cost of these rights was £1.706 billion, a 30% increase from the 
last contract (Dowell, 2006). Therefore, even though BSkyB lost its complete 
exclusivity, it is very much evident that it is still the major force in broadcasting 
top-level English football because of the packages it purchased and the number of 
games it will broadcast.
In trying to compete with BSkyB, a number of television broadcasters over-
invested and as a consequence seriously affected their relationship with football 
clubs. For instance, media companies such as NTL, ITV Digital, and, more recently, 
Setanta have found that they could not maintain the financial outlay they had origi-
nally promised. NTL paid £328 million in 2000 for 44 Premier League games a 
420  Cleland
season on pay per view, but within weeks of the 3-year deal being announced it had 
to withdraw because of financial problems. Similarly, in June 2000 ITV Digital paid 
£183 million for a 3-year deal with the Football League, but it also had to withdraw 
less than a season into the contract. In June 2009, Setanta fell into financial difficul-
ties, with the company missing payments to both the English Premier League and 
the Scottish Premier League. This led to the American TV sports network ESPN 
purchasing the rights to screen 46 live matches in the 2009–10 season and a further 
23 games a season for 3 years in a hastily arranged auction.
Because of the increasing coverage provided by the media (mostly to the Premier 
League) there has been an increasing focus on the developing club–media relationship, 
but whether they share an interdependent relationship has largely been overlooked. 
This relationship has clearly opened up an opportunity to target new audiences and 
has transformed the game into a global phenomenon. In fact, it could be argued 
that the relationship between top-flight football clubs and BSkyB has become one 
of interdependence. This can be seen with the breakdown of revenue for Premier 
League clubs in the 2006–07 season: 39% from broadcasting, 35% from match-day 
revenue, and 26% from commercial/sponsorship revenue (Deloitte & Touche, 2008).3
Deloitte and Touche (2008) provide a further striking example of the devel-
oping interdependent relationship between BSkyB and the Premier League: The 
average annual turnover of a Premier League club is 6 times greater than that of 
a Championship team. Furthermore, Buraimo et al. (2006) found that the Premier 
League’s share of revenue from 1993/94–2002/03 was 74%, compared with 18% 
in the new Championship Division. Therefore, the clubs playing in the Premier 
League are significantly bigger in terms of fan base, coverage, stature, and finance 
than those playing in the Football League and thus are more likely to be a target 
for future investment. In this context, the financial rewards on offer for playing in 
the Premier League are one reason why promotion is vital for the clubs who play 
in the Championship, with the playoff final viewed as the most lucrative game to 
win in club football across the world.
In a way similar to what has been argued about television coverage, teams 
outside the top division in the UK have historically not received a lot of coverage 
in the national media because of their lower profile. Therefore, it is likely that lower 
league clubs and their main local newspaper still share an interdependent relation-
ship. This is not to say that other local media sources are not important—the more 
interest they can provide to local sports, the more people will listen to local radio 
and watch local television. Similarly, lower league clubs need the exposure and 
coverage provided by the local media to maintain interest and encourage people 
to attend matches on a regular basis.
As the club–media relationship continues to grow (mostly at the elite level), 
another development in this relationship centers on the changing patterns of own-
ership in some clubs. In the 1990s, a range of media companies including BSkyB, 
Granada, and NTL invested in clubs because it allowed them to be involved in 
negotiations for future television contracts.4 However, as the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission report into the proposed takeover of Manchester United by 
BSkyB in 2002 outlined, media-company ownership of football clubs raises public 
concerns about the future of the game. It would be no surprise that if rights were 
sold individually it would benefit the bigger clubs and increase the gap further with 
the smaller clubs in the Premier League and also the Football League.
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In this complex and constantly changing environment, some of these media 
companies have now sold some of the shares they held in certain clubs (Gannon 
et al., 2006; O’Connor, 2004). Examples of this include BSkyB’s selling its 9.9% 
stake in Chelsea and writing off a £40 million investment it made in the club in 
2000 and also selling its 9.9% stake in Manchester United for £62 million in 
October 2003. However, it would be wrong to assume that media corporations 
are no longer interested in football clubs, because the developments in new media 
continue to maintain BSkyB’s influence at a number of clubs, including Chelsea, 
where it remains a key media partner. Furthermore and again highlighting the 
changing environment, recent research carried out by Deloitte and Touche (2008) 
found that at a peak, 20 clubs were listed on the stock market (either the London 
Stock Exchange or the Alternative Investment Market), but this has subsequently 
decreased to only 7.
The idea of floating on the stock market seems to be fading, and it has been 
argued that it is better for clubs to have one wealthy owner or benefactor to finance 
them (Buraimo et al., 2006; Horne, 2006). This seems to be the case with, for 
example, Roman Abramovich at Chelsea, Malcolm Glazer at Manchester United, 
and Randy Lerner at Aston Villa, all recently buying into their respective football 
clubs. This reflects the constantly changing picture of ownership at top-level clubs, 
with media-corporation ownership being reduced and replaced by ownership by 
wealthy individuals whose financial input easily makes them majority shareholders.
Because of the developments described here, especially the prominence of 
the media as an actor in the industry, there is a more professional approach in the 
increasing levels of external communication emanating from clubs. Clubs now view 
corporate communications as important, such as dealing with their shareholders, the 
local community, and the general day-to-day queries that arise from supporters, but 
a key test of their communication strategy arises when there is a crisis that requires 
immediate attention. When a crisis does occur there is a need to modify, as far as 
possible, the negative affect it has on the club to protect both its key stakeholders 
and its long-term future (Caywood, 1997; van Riel, 1995). According to Thill and 
Bovée (1993), two communication philosophies are available: say nothing or tell 
all and tell it fast. Each club’s use of media sources becomes vitally important at 
this point: If it copes well with any crisis, its image should be quickly restored, but 
if it fails, its reputation and potential profitability could be damaged.
In summarizing the literature on this area and taking the debate forward, a 
number of questions have arisen that this article now assesses:
• Can the size of a club affect its relationship with the external media?
• What effect has the increase in media sources had on the interdependent rela-
tionship between each football club and its local evening newspaper?
• What effect has the increase in media sources had on the number of club 
employees responsible for external communication?
• To what extent is the local press now more dependent on football clubs because 
of the increasing levels of competition in providing news and information to 
supporters?
• What impact has the development of new media had on the relationship between 
a football club and the external media?
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Method
The methods of data collection and analysis adopted for this article were part of 
wider research that also examined the club–fan relationship and the media–fan 
relationship. Four football clubs—Aston Villa, Birmingham City, Coventry City, 
and Northampton Town—were used to collect the necessary data. These four clubs 
were selected because they had different levels of ownership (Aston Villa was 
“listed” between 1997 and 2006 and Birmingham City has been listed since 1997), 
different numbers of club employees responsible for external communication, and 
different profiles in the wider external media.
To analyze the club–media relationship, a multimethod approach combining both 
qualitative and quantitative methods was employed. Once consent had been obtained, 
47 in-depth semistructured interviews with relevant club officials (those involved in 
the communication process), unofficial external personnel (fanzine editors, unofficial 
Web site editors, and supporters’ group representatives), and local media personnel 
(local journalists involved in newspapers, radio, and television) were conducted. The 
questions centered on two main themes, both of which focused on the two research 
objectives: the organizational structure of clubs in dealing with the external media 
and supporters and the relationship they have with the club/external media (depending 
on whether they were employed by the club or had an external role).
To support the qualitative interview data, a more quantitative questionnaire was 
also employed to collect a larger breadth of data from supporters at each club. While 
it also helped to assess the media–fan and club–fan relationships, the club–media 
aspect of the questionnaire focused on four main questions, the last of which was 
left “open” for supporters to provide feedback to clubs:
• How did fans rank the different media sources in terms of importance?
• Did fans feel that the club provided them with enough information?
• Did fans feel that the club communicated well with them?
• In what ways did fans think the club could improve communication with them?
The interviews were analyzed through a manual form of content analysis. 
Although content analysis can be used quantitatively to count themes numerically, 
each subject’s responses were coded and categorized, thus providing more depth to 
the research. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1984), once all the data had 
been themed into categories, the analysis began to identify “patterns and processes, 
commonalities and differences” (p. 9) across all four clubs.
With regard to the fan survey, 827 questionnaires were completed. They were 
analyzed using SPSS to, first, develop a visual distribution of the data and, second, 
develop cross-tabulations to identify patterns and make comparisons. During the 
data collection, close attention was paid to make sure each response to the open 
question was recorded exactly as it was given, with no attempt at summarizing or 
making grammatical corrections (as suggested by Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In 
fact, some fans provided quite a lot of feedback covering many different aspects of 
communication, and this was taken into account when the coding of their responses 
was carried out. Once all the questionnaires had been collected each response on the 
open question was then coded into 14 themes and entered into SPSS for analysis. 
Themes 1–4 were coded as fan responses, 5–11 were coded as media/communica-
tion responses, and 12–13 were coded as club responses:
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 0. No response to question.
 1. Listen to the fans.
 2. Respect the fans.
 3. More fans’ forums.
 4. Have a fan on the board.
 5. Have a regular newsletter/personal correspondence.
 6. Keep fans better informed.
 7. Use national/local media better.
 8. Improvements with Web site.
 9. Improvements with match-day program.
 10. Have a TV channel.
 11. Improvement is good/communication OK.
 12. More honesty and openness.
 13. More community focus.
Case-Study Findings
In his analysis of English football’s ownership and financial structure, Morrow 
(1999) developed a characterization of football companies by defining three “types”: 
concentrated ownership (where one or a few individuals or institutions own a large 
percentage of shares), diversified ownership with concentrated control (where one 
or a few dominant shareholders exert effective control), and diversified ownership 
(where shareholding is diverse). In adapting Morrow’s typology, the four clubs in 
the current study represented different ownership types and between them played 
in three different divisions of English football. However, the complexity of club-
ownership categories is put into perspective because of the rapidly changing nature 
of this environment; all four clubs had either been taken over or had come very 
close to it over the 4-year period from 2003 to 2007.
From 1997 to 2006 Aston Villa was a listed club, and it has continuously 
played in the Premier League since its inception in 1992. Pre-August 2006 the 
club would have been classified as diversified ownership—concentrated control, 
because Doug Ellis owned 38% of the shares and Jack Petchey owned 20%. This 
changed, however, in August 2006, when Aston Villa was taken over by a foreign 
investor (Randy Lerner) and changed its ownership type to concentrated ownership 
because of the majority shareholding Lerner quickly acquired.
Birmingham City has been a listed club since 1997 and has played in both the 
Premier League and the Championship Division of the Football League in recent 
seasons. It would be classified as diversified ownership—concentrated control as 
a result of the shares owned by Ralph and David Gold, David Sullivan, and more 
recently foreign businessman Carson Yeung. In fact, the club came close to selling 
to Yeung in 2007 when he bought a 29.9% stake in the club. Although no takeover 
materialized at the time (Yeung has kept his shareholding), it again highlights how 
close some clubs can come to changing ownership, especially those that are in the 
most exposed football league in the world.
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On the other hand, Coventry City is an “unlisted” club and since the 2001/02 
season has played in the Championship. From 2003 to December 2007 the club 
would have been classified as concentrated ownership because Geoffrey Robin-
son owned 62% of the shares. However, in December 2007 the club was taken 
over by a London-based investment company called SISU 30 minutes before 
it was due to go into administration but maintained its concentrated-ownership 
classification as a result of the company’s quickly acquiring over 90% of the 
club’s shares.
Northampton Town is also an unlisted club, and even though its ownership and 
organizational structure have included its Supporters’ Trust since the early 1990s, it 
remains faced with many difficult decisions because of its lower league position.5 
In 2002, the club found itself in a precarious financial position and launched an 
SOS (Save Our Season) appeal to its supporters to generate £500,000 by the end of 
January 2003 to pay off money owed to creditors and avoid going into administra-
tion. In December 2002, the club felt it had found its financial savior when Andrew 
Ellis took over from outgoing chairman Barry Stonhill. However, Ellis only lasted 
2 months in charge, and the club’s future was only secured when a consortium led 
by David and Tony Cardoza acquired majority shareholding and in doing so paid 
off some of the club’s long-term debt. Although the Supporters’ Trust maintained 
its shareholding, this change of ownership moved the club from diversified owner-
ship—concentrated control to concentrated ownership.
Because of the size and scope of each organization, it is not surprising that 
there were differences in the number of personnel employed to deal with external 
communication. Both Aston Villa and Birmingham City had either a media officer 
or a press officer who managed their local and national external communication, 
each of whom was also supported by individuals who had specific responsibilities 
in the communication chain such as an official Web site editor and a match-day 
program editor. Aston Villa had the largest number of internal employees solely 
responsible for communicating with the media and its supporters (six), whereas at 
Birmingham City three internal employees were solely responsible for maintaining 
its external communication.
In contrast, at the unlisted clubs a different strategy for external communica-
tion was noticeable, with most employees found to have diverse and nonspecific 
job descriptions. Although Coventry City employed a press officer to oversee its 
external communication, she was also responsible for some of the content on the 
official club Web site. This was not surprising because the size of the club and its 
lack of finances had created the need for diverse job roles, and although the club 
still had to communicate with its shareholders, it understandably had more of a 
local rather than national focus with the distribution of information.
At Northampton Town, and somewhat expected because of its lower league 
status and financial position, only two employees were responsible for managing 
the whole of its external communication. In fact, the media officer stated that the 
club has one of the smallest internal workforces (10 administrators covering all 
aspects of the club) in the whole of professional football. Consequently, its main 
focus when distributing information was often local, rather than national.
From assessing each club’s organizational structure and the increasing pressure 
put on external communication by the media and supporters, it could be suggested 
that there are four “types” of function for a club’s media or press officer:
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• Develop a positive image of the club and its brand.
• Provide information to fans and the external media.
• Develop a two-way relationship with fans by involving them in the club.
• Manage any crises that arise with as little damage and disruption to the club 
as possible.
With regard to the second and third functions, across all four clubs the results of 
the survey illustrated how they could improve their level of external communication. 
For example, at Aston Villa and Coventry City only half of those surveyed felt their 
club communicated effectively with them, while just over half indicated they were 
happy with the amount of information they received. The open-question comments 
for both clubs also centered on the “fan” and “club” themes, including the need for 
more openness and honesty and more fans’ forums to let supporters have their say. 
The results were better at Birmingham City, where nearly three quarters of sup-
porters felt the club communicated effectively with them and provided them with 
enough information. Again, the club theme was raised in the survey, with a number 
of supporters arguing for more openness and honesty. Finally, at Northampton 
Town just over three quarters of supporters felt the club communicated effectively 
with them and were happy with the amount of information they received. However, 
all three survey themes were raised at this club, with supporters arguing for more 
openness and honesty and to keep fans better informed, possibly as a result of the 
financial troubles the club faced. The small number of employees and scope for 
external communication were also highlighted, with some supporters feeling that the 
club could use the external media better and not rely on its internal media sources.
Naturally, the press or media officers provided a positive image, but each 
had to deal with a crisis during the research process. On the sacking of first-team 
manager Graham Taylor in 2003, Aston Villa acted very quickly in naming David 
O’Leary as its new manager, while a similar situation arose at Birmingham City 
through the crowd disturbances that marred both local derby matches with Aston 
Villa during the 2002–03 season and the failed takeover by Carson Yeung in 2007. 
In 2003 the publication of the large debt affecting Coventry City (£60 million) led 
the newly appointed chairman at the time, Mike McGinnity, to improve the club’s 
relationship with the external media (particularly the local press), and again in 2007 
a crisis occurred when the club fell within 30 minutes of administration. Similarly, 
at Northampton Town, the publication of another financial crisis in 2002–03 led to 
the local and wider community contributing to its survival as a professional football 
club. This all confirms the suggestions by Caywood (1997), Thill and Bovée (1993), 
and van Riel (1995) that clubs should act quickly when a crisis arises.
To provide an illustration of how the local media report crises or opportunities 
at clubs, Aston Villa is a good example. When reviewing the content surrounding 
the departure of the first-team manager, Graham Taylor, at the end of the 2002–03 
season in the local press, it was clear how much criticism was raised at the way the 
club communicated externally. In the local morning newspaper, the Birmingham 
Post, the chief football writer Hyder Jawad (2003a) wrote,
Since releasing a statement to announce Taylor’s departure, members of the 
Villa board have refused to discuss key issues at the club. The wall of silence 
has added to the frustration of supporters, many of whom are anxious for 
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regime change at Villa Park. . . . No club in the Premiership has a more bruised 
relationship with its supporters than Villa. (p. 36)
The very next day, Jawad (2003b) was again highly critical of the club’s com-
munication strategy under Doug Ellis: “In the real world, the masses are calling for 
regime change. Aston Villa know this but are doing what they always do in times 
of distress: they put their fingers in their ears and keep their mouths shut” (p. 33).
However, and unknown to the local and national media, the club acted very 
quickly in appointing David O’Leary as manager and by doing so was seen to 
manage the crisis to its advantage. For instance, Jawad (2003c), somewhat begrudg-
ingly it seemed, admitted,
It is not often that Aston Villa succeed in disarming their critics but they did 
so adroitly on Tuesday afternoon. Announcing O’Leary as their new manager 
was a masterstroke in public relations and a message to supporters that, yes, 
everything appears to be under control. . . . By lowering expectations, the 
club was able to emerge with O’Leary and win the propaganda battle. (p. 38)
In highlighting the fluctuating club–media relationship further, even though the 
local media spoke for the majority of fans in stating their approval of the takeover 
by Randy Lerner in 2006, Lerner was occasionally criticized. For instance, only 4 
months after his appointment Murphy (2006) stated,
It would be a timely opportunity for Randy Lerner to communicate his aspira-
tions and vision to the Villa fans. But we wait in vain. Since he took over in 
August, he has blocked all attempts from the media to engage in dialogue with 
us and, by extension, the fans. There are no signs that he plans to do so. That’s 
a pity, because his one and only press conference at Villa Park would have 
been the easiest he would ever have had to face. He has lost a great chance to 
enthuse the supporters, whose goodwill towards him after buying out Doug 
Ellis was massive. (p. 27)
One possible reason that close attention is paid by clubs to external commu-
nication is the increasing number of media (especially new) sources involved in 
football. Not only did they speed up the availability of news and information but 
they also created a competitive media environment, forcing older sources such 
as newspapers and radio to strategically react. Therefore, despite suggestions by 
Sage (1998) that media organizations have no inherent interest in sport, it could 
be questioned whether the proliferation of a range of different sources has made 
the relationship between football clubs and the external press interdependent. 
This has been a result of the debate surrounding the “new business of football” 
(as suggested by Bower, 2003; Dobson & Goddard, 2001; Morrow, 2003) as clubs 
became dependent on the money and exposure generated through the developing 
relationship with television (most notably BSkyB).
This became clear both during the interviews and after analyzing the survey 
data. For example, the rapid development in media sources had taken away the pre-
vious exclusivity granted to local television and local radio. All the local television 
journalists who were interviewed stressed a dependence on clubs to provide them 
with news and information for their bulletins; some of them just took information 
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off each club’s official Web site rather than speaking to the press or media officer. 
Radio’s importance as a local service provider was more apparent with the exclusive 
commentary deals they were involved in. At Birmingham City, Capital Gold/BRMB 
Radio held the commentary rights to all the club’s home and away matches, as did 
BBC Radio Coventry and Warwickshire at Coventry City. At Aston Villa, Capital 
Gold/BRMB Radio held exclusive commentary rights on all away matches and 
five home matches of its choice, with BBC Radio WM holding the rights to the 
other 14 home matches. However, at Northampton Town, BBC Radio Northampton 
did not provide commentary on every football match because of the local interest 
in Northampton Saints Rugby Club. Rather, the radio station focused on the team 
playing away from home, arguing they could thus serve the biggest audience. As 
a consequence, the BBC Radio Northampton sports presenter indicated that his 
radio station was dependent on the football club because
If I lose that relationship with the club trying to put my neck on the block taking 
a gamble for short term gain I do not think it’s really worth it. . . . I won’t sud-
denly come out with something on the radio that I haven’t got clarified as fact.
The results for the local evening newspaper–club relationship suggested a con-
tinued interdependence. Despite a fall in newspaper sales, the importance of clubs’ 
maintaining links with their local community through the local evening newspaper 
can be found in the respective sales. For example, figures released by the Press 
Gazette (“Regional ABCs,” 2008) highlight how the Birmingham Evening Mail 
sold over 66,000 copies per evening, the Coventry Evening Telegraph sold over 
46,000 copies per evening, and the Northampton Chronicle and Echo sold nearly 
20,000 copies per evening. It is worth mentioning that these newspapers are also 
available online, with a large number of people choosing to read them in their own 
time rather than actually buying an evening edition.
The importance of the role played by the local evening newspaper as part of 
a club’s external communication was also clear when the results of the fan survey 
were analyzed. When supporters were asked to name their single most important 
source of news and information on their club, at Aston Villa, Birmingham City, and 
Coventry City the local evening newspaper was named. This, therefore, supports 
the continuation of the historic interdependent relationship between clubs and the 
local newspaper. However, to highlight the growth of new media, the official club 
Web site was a close second in terms of importance for club news and information 
at those three clubs and was the most important at Northampton Town.
Although clubs now have their own internal sources of communication such 
as their official Web sites, match-day programs, mobile-phone texting, and other 
points of contact, across all four clubs the staff employed to deal with external 
communication all stressed the importance of a healthy relationship with the local 
media. For example, the head of media at Aston Villa stated that the local media 
were vital because “the working man’s contact with the football club is essentially 
going to be through the local media . . . that is for a lot of people the way that 
supporters will communicate or gain information perhaps more accurately with 
the football club.”
Similarly, the match-day program editor at Aston Villa illustrated that the 
changing times in football and the media coverage the club received nationally 
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made it less dependent on the local press than it was at one time, but he thought 
“they have got a crucial role to play” even at a club the size of Aston Villa. However, 
he did stress the importance of this relationship by stating that “the club need the 
media and the media obviously need the club . . . without the day-to-day stories 
on television, radio and newspapers the club would struggle to generate interest 
on their own.”
Despite the occasional criticism of the club raised earlier, the interdependent 
relationship between the Birmingham Evening Mail and the club was clear, with 
the Aston Villa journalist employed by the Birmingham Evening Mail stating that 
“they need us and we do need them . . . no question their partnership with us helps 
us. . . . [They] sell our papers definitely . . . they could make it bloody difficult for 
us by closing the doors completely.”
At Birmingham City, again an interdependent relationship between the Birming-
ham Evening Mail and the club came through the interviews with the Web site editor 
at the club, who stated that the relationship was a “partnership [as] we’ll try to help 
them and they will help us, it definitely is a two-way thing [as] they can’t do their 
job without our cooperation and our job is more difficult without their cooperation.”
Similarly, the press officer illustrated how he believed Birmingham City 
received more coverage in the Birmingham Evening Mail than Aston Villa or West 
Bromwich Albion, with the official Web site taking over as the main provider of 
news and information outside of its circulation area. These views were also stated 
by the match-day program editor, who acknowledged that the local evening news-
paper was crucial to the club’s longevity, because its wide circulation helped the 
club provide news and information to a large number of supporters.
Because of the lack of national exposure of lower league football, employees 
at both Coventry City and Northampton Town viewed the local press as crucial 
in providing as much coverage and exposure as possible. In fact, Coventry City’s 
relationship with the local press had changed from a negative one when Bryan 
Richardson was chairman (pre-2003) to one where it recognized the importance 
of using the local press to communicate with its supporters better. The constant 
reference to a new “open and honest” approach to its external communication was 
well received by the local media, who began to be more supportive of the club as 
a result of club officials’ being available for comment on a regular basis. Speak-
ing at the press conference immediately after his appointment as club chairman in 
2003, Mike McGinnity stated,
We’ve got to give 100 per cent honesty to our fans. They are the most important 
people at any football club. If we have support through the gate, and work 
together, the board in particular, and the management of the football team will 
succeed. (Turner, 2002, p. 2)
During the course of this research, it became apparent that there was a changing 
emphasis from Coventry City with regard to the relationship it had with external (espe-
cially local) media sources. For instance, after relegation from the Premier League, 
the commercial manager noted how the club’s view of the local media had changed to 
one where it tried to support their activities and grant them “almost unfettered access.” 
Similarly, the press officer outlined how “the local media are invaluable,” and if they 
were to stop covering the club it would create a “large gaping hole. . . . We could 
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end up losing a lot of support because people wouldn’t have the resources to find 
any information out on Coventry City. . . . I think that could damage us a great deal.”
Even though the local media are important at a club like Coventry City, the 
interdependent relationship between the club and the Coventry Evening Telegraph 
was also stressed by the local print journalist:
It’s a two-way thing, they need us as much as we need them . . . the vast major-
ity of people who buy the Evening Telegraph do so for the sport, so it is a huge 
thing for us but by the same token the club need the newspaper to spread the 
news and views and make the fans aware of what is going on.
Naturally, because of its position in professional football, the head of media at 
Northampton Town stated that the club worked closely with the local media to try 
to provide the widest profile for the club as possible. He also believed that because 
most of its support was more than likely local, the profile the club received in the 
local media was paramount to its survival. These views were supported when the 
Northampton Chronicle and Echo sponsored the SOS appeal issued by the club 
in 2002, with the local journalist covering the club also contributing a section in 
the match-day program. However, he could not be supportive all the time, because 
events on and off the field meant that articles perceived as negative by the club 
also had to be covered in order for the newspaper to retain credibility among its 
readers. This all helped support the continued interdependent relationship between 
the Northampton Chronicle and Echo and the club.
Nationally, the involvement of BSkyB has created an interdependent relation-
ship with top-level football clubs such as Aston Villa and Birmingham City because 
of the exposure and financial investment made (Buraimo et al., 2006; Deloitte & 
Touche, 2008). However, despite Coventry City and Northampton Town being 
more dependent on local rather than national media for regular news and coverage, 
because of the financial rewards available from BSkyB they are more dependent on 
BSkyB to broadcast their matches, because gate receipts would not be as high as 
those of Premier League clubs. As for the relationship between each club and the 
other external sources, the results of the survey and the in-depth interviews both 
highlighted that although they remained important, clubs were less dependent on 
them than vice versa (such as fanzines and unofficial Web sites).
Conclusion
This article has presented many changes in the club–media relationship. First, 
it outlined how quickly clubs can change their ownership and organizational 
structure; between 2003 and 2007 three clubs went through major organizational 
change, with Birmingham City coming very close to doing so. Second, it stated 
the importance of establishing external communication mechanisms to deal with 
the increasing demand for news and information from supporters and the media. 
To do this, three of the clubs had employed press or media officers. As the big-
gest clubs in this research, the roles for internal personnel in the communication 
process were clearer at Aston Villa and Birmingham City than at Coventry City 
and Northampton Town because the bigger clubs had more national exposure than 
those that competed outside of the Premier League.
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This article also illustrated the changing levels of dependence between the 
“old” and “new” media and clubs. Both the interview and survey data stressed the 
continuation of an interdependent relationship between the local evening newspaper 
and all four clubs, as well as between BSkyB and the clubs in the Premier League. 
They also highlight how the proliferation of new media has taken away some of 
the dependence on certain aspects of the local press. Although certain local radio 
stations had exclusive radio commentary deals with clubs and remained an important 
link between each club and its fans, their overall importance as a source for news 
and information has been affected. Equally, the once “cozy” relationship between 
local television and clubs has been affected by the desire for immediate news and 
information on football and has resulted in local television being more dependent 
on clubs than vice versa.
Finally, as the club–media relationship continues to evolve and ownership and 
personnel changes occur at clubs, the clubs need to remember that they are involved 
in two-way relationships with the media and with the fans and that these relation-
ships demand appropriate management. As this article has indicated, this manage-
ment has to be constantly responsive to changes in technology and popular culture. 
The dangers of not taking account of this have been clearly shown in the disastrous 
experiences of Newcastle United under Mike Ashley, maybe even Liverpool under 
George Gillett and Tom Hicks, and possibly also the negative publicity that the 
Glazers have incurred at Manchester United. These are all examples of media and 
fan relationships that have been badly handled by clubs and indicate that this is an 
ongoing and high-profile issue for club owners and managers.
Notes
1. In terms of media or society relations, it has been suggested that interdependency occurs 
where an equal relationship is found between the external press and social institutions (Coakley, 
2003; O’Sullivan, Dutton, & Rayner, 2003).
2. BSkyB paid £670 million for a 4-year contract from 1997 to 2000, £1.1 billion for a 3-year 
contract from 2001 to 2003, and £1.1 billion for a 3-year contract from 2004 to 2006.
3. In 1991–92, television revenue provided just 9% of turnover (Robinson, 2007).
4. Media companies are not allowed by the Football Association to own more than 10% in a 
club because of their rule on dual ownership. If a media company owns less than 10% in a football 
club the Football Association will allow it as long as the shares are held for investment purposes.
5. The Supporters’ Trust at Northampton Town was one of the first to be established and 
arose after the club fell into administration. To keep the club running, the Supporters’ Trust paid 
£105,000 into the club from 1994 to 2001, accruing a 7% share. In the process, this also led to 
them having a representative on the board of directors (Lomax, 2001).
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